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Abstract 
In this paper we seek to understand the impact of the macro-political context on power 
configurations within policy subsystems. For this purpose we systematically compare policy 
networks in three major policy subsystems and seven Western European countries (and the 
EU) on the basis of a typology for the power configurations within policy subsystems. We 
link the European, domestic and policy-specific context to our typology of policy networks. 
To test the hypotheses we conduct empirical network and reputational analysis of 345 
interviews with key policy makers. The results point not only to the importance of the EU 
context, but also to the complex interplay of domestic and policy-specific contexts for 
understanding domestic power configurations. Domestic power configurations vary not only 
from country to country, but also within the countries depending on the policy domain.  
 
Keywords: network analysis, policy networks, power structures, European integration, 
agriculture, immigration  
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Models for the power structure in a policy subsystem 
Policy-making takes place in policy domain-specific subsystems, which operate more or less 
independently of one another in a parallel fashion. Such policy subsystems consist of a large 
number of actors dealing with specific policy issues. Political processes in these subsystems 
are not controlled by state actors alone; rather, they are characterized by interactions of public 
and private actors. The concern with a larger variety of actors and their interactions has given 
prominence to the concept of policy networks. The term policy network – as we use it here – 
is to be understood as a generic label that embraces different forms of relations between state 
actors and private actors (Jordan and Schubert 1992: 10; Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 186). 
We build on the various typologies that have been developed in order to capture the different 
forms of state-private actor relations within policy networks. The first dimension that we use 
for our typology of power structures is often referred to in the literature as being central: the 
distribution of power (see Rhodes and Marsh 1992, Atkinson and Coleman 1989, van 
Waarden 1992). This dimension is above all concerned with whether power is concentrated 
in the hands of one dominant actor or coalition of actors or whether it is shared between 
actors or coalitions of actors. In addition, this dimension also includes the attribution of 
power to specific types of actors. We shall distinguish between state actors and three types of 
actors in the system of interest intermediation: political parties, interest groups and non-
governmental organizations/social movement organizations (NGOs or SMOs). In other 
words, we extend the focus of the corporatism-pluralism literature beyond interest groups and 
analyze a larger range of participants in the policy-making process. 
When concerned with the types of political actors involved in policy networks, the literature 
attracts our attention to the fact that we are likely to encounter coalitions rather than single 
actors. The advocacy coalition approach (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999) provides us with 
the basic insight into the role of actor coalitions for the dynamics of the policy process: at a 
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given moment, in a given subsystem we are likely to find a limited number of coalitions with 
varying political influence on the political processes within the subsystem. Domain-specific 
policy-making is typically dominated by one of these coalitions that exerts, what 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) have termed, a “policy monopoly”. Coalitions can be 
composed of one type of actors only (homogenous), or they can incorporate different actor 
types (heterogeneous). Including this aspect into the first dimension – distribution of power – 
allows for a differentiated account of the power structure within the political process.  
However, power structures cannot solely be accounted for by this single dimension. We also 
need to take into account the dominant type of interaction between actors or coalitions as a 
second basic dimension. The strength of the policy network concept – in our understanding – 
is its relational perspective on the policy process. We suggest that the actors’ interactions 
reveal an essential part of the power structure within a policy subsystem as “power is not a 
property or attribute that is inherent in an individual or group in the way that an electrical 
battery stores so many volts of energy. Rather, power is an aspect of the actual or potential 
interactions between two or more social actors” (Knoke 1990: 1). Depending on the degree of 
cooperation among actors and actor coalitions, we distinguish between three forms: 
(predominance of) conflict/competition, (predominance of) bargaining and (predominance of) 
cooperation. Bargaining constitutes an intermediary or ambivalent type of interaction that is 
characterized by both conflict/competition and cooperation.  
By combining the two dimensions describing the power structure in a network – the 
distribution of power and the type of interaction – six policy configurations can be derived 
(see Figure 1). The first configuration is the one we call “challenge” (of the dominant 
coalition by minority coalitions), a situation where power is fragmented and the predominant 
type of interaction is conflictual. If power is concentrated and the mode of interaction is 
conflictual, we face a situation of “dominance”. Bargaining is either symmetric or 
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asymmetric – depending on the degree of concentration of power. If the interaction is 
characterized by cooperation, we argue that the distribution of power loses importance: such 
cases are presumably allowing for influence on the policy-process by dominant coalitions and 
challengers alike. 
 
 < Figure 1 about here > 
 
The political context 
We focus on the contextual determinants of the policy-specific power structures. Looking at 
three selected policy domains in seven Western European countries – Germany (D), France 
(F), Italy (I), the Netherlands (NL), Spain (E), Switzerland (CH) and the United Kingdom 
(UK) – and at the supranational level of the European Union (EU), we describe and analyze 
power structures as a function of the macro-political context in the specific policy 
subsystems. Three basic aspects of the macro-political context are to be distinguished: the 
European context, the national context and the policy-specific context. 
 
The European context 
Following the work of several influential political scientists (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 
2003, Hooghe and Marks 2001, Cowles and Risse 2001), we assume that European 
integration over the past decades has led to the creation of a polity of an unprecedented kind 
– a system of multilevel governance that encompasses a variety of authoritative institutions at 
supranational, national, and sub-national levels of decision-making. According to this point 
of view, the EU constitutes a distinct structure of governance, which is not structurally 
isomorphic to any of the individual EU member states, not even the big three. The 
development of this Euro-polity has gone hand in hand with a politicization and a widening 
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scope of the decision-making at the EU-level. From the point of view of national political 
actors, the emergence of the new supranational layer of decision-making at the EU-level 
implies a transformation of their macro-political context. The EU level adds new 
opportunities and constraints, which modify the distribution of power at the domestic level.  
The impact of this new layer of decision-making on the domain-specific distribution of power 
depends most obviously on whether or not a country is member of the EU. Accordingly, we 
expect the distribution of power and the pattern of interactions to be more affected in EU-
member states than in countries such as Switzerland, which are not part of the EU. In 
addition, for EU-member states, the impact on the domain-specific distribution of power 
depends on the degree to which decision-making competences have shifted to the EU level. 
The extent of such a shift, in turn, is a function of the policy domain. It is the policies of the 
so-called first pillar – the four freedoms of movement, agriculture, competition, trade and, 
recently, also visa and asylum policies – and constitutional issues concerning the construction 
of the EU-polity, where decision-making at the EU-level has become most salient. In our 
study, three policy domains will be analyzed, all belonging to the high salience category:  
• European integration, i.e. the institutional construction of the EU (in particular the 
question of the Convention; for the non-member state Switzerland, we consider the 
negotiations of the Bilateral Agreements with the EU) 
• Agricultural policy (in particular agricultural subsidies), i.e. one of the key policy 
domains of the first pillar, where the EU has crucial policy responsibilities 
• Immigration policy (in particular questions concerning political refugees), i.e. a 
domain which, based on the Amsterdam Treaty, has equally become part of the first 
pillar.  
 
 6 
The very high degree of Europeanization of the constitutional issues of the EU is obvious as 
is the high degree of Europeanization of agricultural policy, which absorbs, since the turn of 
the millennium, on average 45 per cent of the EU’s annual budget (European Commission 
2005). In immigration policy and justice and home affairs (JHA) more generally, however, 
the shift of decision-making competences to the supranational level is still less pronounced 
(Lavenex 2001: 854). The “Community method” of integration is replaced by a new mode of 
policy-making in the domains belonging to JHA, which has been called “intensive 
transgovernmentalism”. This mode depends mainly on interactions between the relevant 
national policy-makers and implies relatively little involvement by the EU institutions 
(Wallace 2000a: 33).  
 
The domestic context 
The core of the domestic political opportunity structures is made up of the formal political 
institutions which regulate the distribution of power. Lijphart’s (1999) typology of 
democracies allows us to distinguish between country-specific institutional structures accor-
ding to the extent to which they concentrate power. Lijphart makes a distinction between 
“consensus democracies” – i.e. countries which share power between several institutions and 
between different political forces within each institution – and “majoritarian democracies” – 
i.e. democracies which concentrate power in the hands of a few political institutions and 
actors. Based on Lijphart’s assessment of the power sharing, we can roughly divide our seven 
countries into three groups – the group of the consensual-federal democracies (CH, D), the 
group of the more majoritarian-unitarian democracies (F, UK) and the intermediary types 
(either consensual-unitarian (I, NL) or majoritarian-federal (E)). As far as Italy is concerned, 
its recent change in the electoral system brought it closer to the majoritarian model, but we 
should acknowledge that its institutional structure in many ways still contributes to the 
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sharing of power (Hine 1993: 2). As for the EU, its institutions are, according to Lijphart 
(1999: 42-47), of the consensual-federal type.  
Organizational sociologists have long insisted on the difference between the formal and the 
informal side of structure. Analogously, we should take into account the distinction between 
the formal institutional structure and the informal ways in which it is typically applied. 
Scharpf (1984: 260) has used the concept of the “dominant strategy” to characterize the 
informal premises of procedure, the shared implicit or explicit understandings which emerge 
from the policy process, and which guide the actions of the authorities. We can distinguish 
here between political contexts according to the extent to which they induce political actors 
to cooperate informally. Consensus democracies provide strong incentives for cooperation 
among political actors, while majoritarian democracies go together with a more competitive 
or unilateral style of policy-making. Thus, cooperation is expected to be rather low in France 
and Italy, while it is expected to be rather high in Switzerland, Germany and the Netherlands. 
Spain is expected to be a mixed case in this respect as well: on the one hand, it has a long 
history of authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, its transition to democracy has been 
exemplary with regard to the cooperation among the elites and the decentralization of power 
(Linz and Stepan 1995; Perez-Diaz 1993).  
However, there is not necessarily a one-to-one relationship between the two aspects of the 
political opportunity structure. Thus, the British style of policy-making is known to 
“emphasize consensus and a desire to avoid the imposition of solutions on sections of 
society” (Jordan and Richardson 1982: 81); in Britain, the concentrated power is used with a 
certain informal restraint (Punnett 1989: 208). By contrast, the Italian style of policy-making 
appears to be more unilateral, although the country has institutions which are rather of the 
more consensus-democratic type. As far as the EU is concerned, if it does grant formal 
political access, the informal hurdles which non-governmental actors must pass in order to be 
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effectively taken into consideration are quite important, which is why we would consider it to 
be less cooperative than it appears at first sight (Marks and McAdam 1999; Streeck and 
Schmitter 1991). Combining the two dimensions, we get the typology of country-specific 
opportunity structures that is represented in Figure 2. 
 
 < Figure 2 about here > 
 
 
The policy-specific context 
The pattern of interaction in a policy domain in particular, additionally depends on the phase 
of policy-making within the domain. Following Baumgartner und Jones (1993, 2002) we 
assume that the policy monopoly of the dominant coalition remains intact as long as it is not 
destabilized by exogenous shocks and/or the mobilization of competing coalitions. Linking 
policy phase to the type of interaction, we expect interaction patterns to be rather cooperative 
in stable phases of policy-making, while they are expected to become more conflictual in a 
critical phase. In other words, power structures are more conflictual, when the policy process 
in a given subsystem attracts the attention of the wider public and of macro-politics than 
when it is in a routinized state. 
The constitutional issues of European integration have been in a critical phase at the time of 
our study. The Convention for an EU constitution represents one of those intermittent grand 
bargains or critical phases that establish the basic features of the EU’s institutional design and 
that are so dear to intergovernmentalists (e.g. Moravcsik 1993). The same applies to the 
negotiations for Bilateral Agreements between Switzerland and the EU, as far as Switzerland 
is concerned. By contrast, agricultural policy was in a rather steady state during the period of 
our study with only routinely lingering international pressure for change – although 
Commissioner Fischler used the 2002/2003 midterm review of the Agenda 2000 as an 
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occasion to introduce further reform. Visa and asylum policy, finally, has become a highly 
politicized issue in domestic politics in most Western European countries. It has given rise to 
mobilizations by the radical-populist right in domestic politics. Accordingly, compared to 
agricultural policy, the domains of European integration and of asylum policies were high on 
the public agenda and of macro-politics during the period studied. This means that we expect 
more overall conflict in these two domains than in agricultural policy.  
In addition, we expect variation with regard to the pattern of conflict in a given policy 
domain between the countries. For lack of space, we cannot formulate hypotheses for every 
single country; we can only present a few hypotheses to illustrate our approach. For the non 
EU-member Switzerland, the relationship between the country and the European and global 
context has become the key political cleavage over the past decade (Kriesi et al. 2005). This 
is why we expect a high degree of conflict in all three Swiss policy domains, but especially 
with regard to EU-integration and immigration. Although the degree of overall cooperation is 
high in Swiss politics, this does not preclude a high degree of conflict in some policy-
domains. Or, more generally: there is also conflict in consensus democracies. The essential 
point is that, in consensus democracies, conflicts are managed in a less confrontational way 
than in majoritarian democracies and are therefore likely to be “hidden” in – what we call in 
our typology – bargaining situations. For the EU-member states, the question of the 
Constitution has always been most contested in the UK, while it has been rather uncontested 
in the European South (Italy and Spain among our countries). Asylum policy, by contrast, has 
become more contested in the European South, while it has until very recently been kept out 
of domestic politics in the North-West of Europe (the Netherlands and the UK among our 
countries). Accordingly, we expect the Southern European countries to have relatively high 
levels of conflict in immigration, but not in EU-integration, while we expect the reverse for 
the UK and, as far as immigration is concerned, for the Netherlands. 
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Data and operationalizations 
The analysis is based on 345 semi-structured interviews with four categories of actors (state 
actors, political parties, interest associations, and SMO-NGOs) present in three policy fields 
(immigration, agriculture and European integration) in seven countries (CH, F, D, I, NL, E, 
UK) and the EU level. The most important person in charge of designing an organization’s 
mobilization and communication strategy was interviewed. The interviews were conducted 
face to face or by phone by members of the different country teams of the EUROPUB.COM 
project in 2003. The interviews are distributed as follows over the countries in question: CH: 
48 (13.9 %); D: 47 (13.6 %); E: 43 (12.5 %); F: 32 (9.3 %); I 49 (14.2 %); NL: 45 (13.0 %); 
UK: 42 (12.2 %); EU: 39 (11.3 %). 
For each policy field, we intended to select the four most important organizations in each one 
of our four categories of actors. Note that this selection procedure does not necessarily 
include all the most important actors in a policy domain. It could be that all the SMO-NGOs 
were marginal in one of the policy domains, while several additional state actors played a key 
role. While neglecting some key actors, this procedure has the advantage of providing us with 
information about all four types of actors.  
In order to analyze the two dimensions describing power structures – the distribution of 
power (including the composition of the coalitions) and the type of interaction – we draw on 
reputational and network indicators. The power of an actor is operationalized by reputational 
measures. These are based on a set of questions referring to a list of 40 organizations, which 
included all the actors whom the country teams considered to be the most important ones in 
the respective domains based on media content analyses performed earlier in the project. The 
16 interviewed organizations constitute a subset of the 40 organizations on the list. The 
interviewees were first asked to name all organizations on this list, which, from their point of 
view, have been particularly influential in the respective policy domain over the past five 
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years. Next, they were asked to name the three most influential organizations, and, finally, 
the most influential one. For each actor on the list of 40, an overall indicator is calculated out 
of these three questions that shows the power that is attributed to the respective actor. For 
each policy domain in each country, the maximum value of this indicator has been set to 1 
and the remaining values have been adjusted accordingly.  
The questions on networks are very much inspired by earlier work about political elites and 
their involvement in specific policy areas (e.g. Knoke et al. 1996; Kriesi 1980; Kriesi and 
Jegen 2001; Laumann and Pappi 1976; Laumann and Knoke 1987). The respondents were 
again presented with the list of 40 organizations. For each actor on the list, they were then 
asked specific questions about three types of interactions – alliances, oppositional 
relationships and targeting. In particular they were asked whether they had 
• “closely collaborated” with this actor over the last five years (cooperation), 
• “some major disagreements” with this actor over the last five years (conflict), 
• "tried to influence“ him over the last five years (targeting). 
 
Note that we could obtain complete information for systematic network analyses only for the 
organizations included in the study that completed this part of the questionnaire. In other 
words, we could get at best a complete network of 16 organizations per issue domain and 
country. In order to determine the dominant type of interaction and the basic coalitions 
within a policy-subsystem we use network-analytical procedures to analyze the three 
matrices of ties between these organizations.1 The type of interaction is determined by the 
relative density of the different types of ties. To study coalition structures we draw on block-
model analysis. A block model consists of two elements (Wasserman and Faust 1999: 395). 
First, it divides actors in the network into discrete subsets called “positions” or “blocks”. 
Actors are placed within the same block if they have similar relations to all the other actors 
and are, therefore, regarded as "structurally equivalent". For each policy-domain in each 
 12 
country four blocks have been identified. Second, for each network, a “block model” 
represents the pattern of ties between and within these blocks. The presence or absence of a 
tie between two blocks depends on the density of the ties among the actors composing them. 
We regard a relation as present, if the density of ties is above .1. The advantage of block 
model analysis is that we can analyze each type of interaction separately or all three at one 
and the same time. The resulting pattern of ties between and within blocks can be represented 
by a complex “image matrix” that distinguishes between cooperative ties, bargaining ties, 
conflict ties and no ties at all.  
It must be kept in mind that, for each country-specific policy domain, only a limited number 
of actors has been interviewed. In order to check whether these actors include the most 
powerful ones at the domestic level, we compared their power with that of the remaining 
actors on the list of 40. The results of the respective comparisons were quite satisfactory. 
With some exceptions – mainly, but not exclusively, from France and Italy –, the actors we 
have interviewed include the most important ones overall, and the most important ones in 
each category. Knowing about the possible shortcomings of our selection procedure and the 
limited number of interviews, these results give us confidence in the quality of our data. 
Nevertheless, we should mentioned that, in three cases, the respondents were less than 
willing to provide us with information on their network ties (agriculture in France, and EU 
integration in Italy and the EU). Therefore, the corresponding three networks are not 
analyzed in detail. 
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Results 
The impact of the EU context on power structures 
The first aspect of the configuration of power in a given policy domain concerns the relative 
power of the domestic vs. European or other supranational actors (e.g. WTO). This aspect 
can be tested based on the reputational power of all 40 actors in each one of the three policy 
domains in our countries. First of all, we observe that membership in the EU is, indeed, a 
crucial factor in determining the distribution of power in a given policy domain: in 
Switzerland, power remains almost exclusively in the hands of domestic actors – at least in 
the perception of the members of the Swiss political elites – while this is no longer the case 
for EU-members. For the latter states, the Europeanization of power varies according to the 
policy domain. This becomes quite clear, when we compare the total amount of reputational 
power of the European and other supranational actors on the list of 40 with the corresponding 
total amount of power of the domestic actors on the same list. Figure 3 provides the ratios of 
the total power of supranational and the total power of domestic actors for (1) the whole 
group of 40, (2) the three most important actors and (3) the most important actor. Figure 3 
not only shows that a shift of power to the supranational (i.e. above all European) level 
heavily depends on the policy-domain: as expected, it is most important for the constitutional 
issue of EU-integration and least important for immigration. Agriculture is situated in 
between the two. Even more interestingly, the shift of power is more important for the key 
actors than for the domain-specific elites as a whole. Considering the elites as a whole, 
European and supranational actors are no more powerful than their domestic colleagues in 
EU-integration. In agriculture and immigration, the domestic elites remain even more 
powerful than the European ones. Considering only the key actors, however, supranational 
actors are up to four times more powerful than domestic ones. This result provides an 
important qualification of our general hypothesis: the shift of power to the EU-level is most 
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pronounced at the top, while the balance of power remains more equilibrated, if we consider 
the domain-specific power structures as a whole.  
 
 < Figure 3 about here >  
 
As far as the pattern of interaction between domestic and supranational actors is concerned, 
the density of cooperation between domestic actors and supranational actors is generally 
higher in EU-member states than in Switzerland.  
 
The impact of the domestic and policy-specific context on power structures 
For the analysis of the domestic power structure, we only take into consideration the set of 
organizations interviewed in the study. We proceed in several steps. First, we take a look at 
the overall situation with regard to the concentration of power and the degree of cooperation 
in a given country. The former is measured by the standard deviation of the distribution of 
power – with a high standard deviation indicating a high degree of fragmentation, and a low 
standard deviation indicating a high degree of concentration of power. We distinguish 
between a low, average and high degree of concentration. Cooperation, in turn, is measured 
by the density of the cooperative relations among the set of domestic organizations. We 
distinguish again between three levels of cooperation. The relevant indicators can be found in 
Tables A1 and A2 on the web page of the first author under the link to this paper. Figure 4a 
shows the empirical classification of the countries using the combination of the country-
specific overall means for the two indicators – irrespective of the policy domains.  
 
  < Figure 4 about here > 
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Comparing this classification with the expected typology in Figure 2, the overall empirical 
pattern corresponds to a large extent to the expected one. However, we note three minor 
deviations and a more important one. The minor deviations concern the EU, the Netherlands 
and Spain, while the major one refers to the UK. The latter turns out to be much less 
concentrated than expected: although it constitutes Lijphart’s paradigmatic case for a 
majoritarian democracy, its policy networks have a fragmented character which actually 
resembles the characteristics of Swiss networks, the paradigmatic case of a consensus 
democracy!  
Secondly, we consider differences between the policy domains with regard to cooperative 
relationships and concentration. It turns out that the country-specific level of cooperation 
varies considerably from one policy domain to the other (see Figure 4b). Except for Italy, 
cooperation is generally relatively intense in immigration, but below average in the other two 
policy domains. In the UK, the level of cooperation varies most from one domain to the 
other. In the UK, cooperation is exceptionally high in immigration, which explains why, on 
average, the UK has an above average level of cooperation. By contrast, with regard to 
European integration and agriculture, the level of cooperation in the UK is far below average, 
which is just as unexpected as the highly decentralized character of its policy networks. In 
Spain, the domain-specific variation concerns the degree of cooperation as well as that of 
concentration. Spain’s overall average situation is a result of quite diverse characteristics of 
the three policy networks: the immigration network is both highly cooperative and little 
concentrated, whereas the European integration network is little cooperative and little 
concentrated and the agricultural network somewhat cooperative and highly concentrated. 
Thirdly, we include conflict and ambivalent relations in the analysis. It is possible that a 
policy network is characterized by both a high degree of cooperation and a high degree of 
conflict. Such a combination arises when there are internally highly integrated coalitions 
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which oppose each other, or when there are many ambivalent relationships, i.e. cooperative 
relations with other actors with whom one also has major disagreements. The first of these 
two conditions refers to the pattern we have called “conflict”, the second to “bargaining”. It is 
important to understand that even in a consensus democracy, a policy network may be 
characterized by conflict or bargaining. If the corresponding subsystem is in a critical phase, 
we expect conflict to be high, independently of the macro-political context. Conversely, in a 
majoritarian democracy, a subsystem may be in an equilibrium phase and the pattern of 
interactions may be essentially cooperative. Figure 5 shows the density ratios for the relative 
importance of conflict and bargaining relations as compared to cooperative relations. A value 
of 0.5, for example, indicates that conflictual relations reach 50% of the density of 
cooperative ones. For the final classification of the networks based on these density ratios, we 
shall adopt the following definitions: where ratios for conflict take on intermediate values 
(between .3 and .5) and those for bargaining are roughly equally prominent, we attribute the 
network to the bargaining category. Where conflict ratios are equal to or greater than .5, we 
refer the network to the conflict category.  
 
 < Figure 5 about here > 
 
As expected, European integration and immigration tend to be more conflictual than 
agriculture. However, in each policy-domain, there are large variations in the level of conflict 
and bargaining from one country to the other. In European integration, the situation is either 
conflictual or cooperative, while bargaining turns out to be rare. The Swiss network in this 
domain is the most conflictual of all. We also find a conflictual network for EU-integration in 
the UK. This result is not very surprising, given the widespread Euroscepticism in these two 
countries (see Kriesi 2005). More unexpected is the relatively high level of conflict in the 
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German EU-integration network. In the other countries – the Netherlands, France and Spain – 
the EU-integration policy networks are neither characterized by bargaining nor by conflict. 
Given our definitions, we consider them as examples of cooperation. In agriculture, 
bargaining predominates. Only in Italy and at the EU-level, the agricultural domain is 
characterized by a pattern of conflict, while cooperation is characteristic of the agricultural 
domain in the UK. In immigration, the networks are mainly conflictual with the Dutch, 
British and EU networks constituting the exceptions here.  
Figure 4c adds the information about conflict and bargaining patterns presented in Figure 5 
to the information presented in Figure 4b. The combined information allows us to 
characterize the policy-specific networks in terms of our theoretical typology in Figure 1. 
The resulting typology is quite different from the overall situation in Figure 4a: In European 
integration, we find a situation of challenge (in Switzerland and the UK) or dominance (in 
Germany), on the one hand, and one of cooperation (in France, the Netherlands and Spain) on 
the other. In agriculture, we find even more variation from one country to the other: In Italy 
and at the EU-level, the agricultural network is in a state of dominance. In Germany, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland, there is symmetrical and in Spain asymmetrical bargaining, 
while cooperation prevails in the UK. In immigration, the situation is most critical in 
Germany and Spain (challenge) and also quite challenging in Switzerland, France, and Italy. 
In the Netherlands, the immigration network is rather characterized by symmetrical 
bargaining and in the UK and at the EU-level, the relations are, according to our 
operationalizations, mainly cooperative.  
 
Composition of coalitions  
We finally turn to the composition of the domestic coalitions in a given policy network, i.e. 
we introduce the results of the block-model analyses. Based on such analyses, we distinguish 
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between four blocks in each network. Each one of these blocks refers to a coalition or to a 
satellite of a coalition (in case of a zero-block, i.e. an internally unconnected block). 
Surprisingly, the partitioning of the networks based on this procedure results in blocks which 
are relatively homogenous with regard to the type of actors. This is shown in Table 1. 
Independently of the policy domain or the country, the first block is typically dominated by 
state actors and it is also typically the most powerful block. Roughly two-thirds of the actors 
in the first block are state actors, and their average power is almost twice as high as that of 
the next two blocks. The second block is dominated by parties, but it also includes an 
important share of state actors. The remaining two blocks are typically composed of interest 
groups and SMO-NGO’s – with the former dominating the third block and the latter 
dominating the fourth block.  
 
  < Table 1 about here > 
 
We have calculated the average power of the actors for each block and constructed a complex 
image matrix for each block-model. Tables A3 and A4 that can be found on the first author’s 
web page contain the relevant information. Image matrices have the advantage that they can 
be represented by simple graphs. Figure 6 presents such a graph for the example of EU-
integration. This graph contains the image matrix for all the countries with sufficient 
information in the corresponding domain. The blocks are represented by circles, the ties by 
arrows. The blocks are numbered and the text below the image matrices provides a rough 
indication of the composition of the corresponding blocks. The circles are shaded according 
to the power of the block. Very powerful blocks (mean power >.60) are dark, moderately 
powerful blocks are grey (.30 <mean power <.60), and weak blocks are white (mean power 
<.30). The arrows refer to the type of tie: bold arrows indicate cooperation, normal arrows 
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bargaining, interrupted ones conflict. The absence of an arrow indicates that there is no 
relationship whatsoever between two blocks. Note that the first two blocks and the last two 
blocks were only split in the second step of the block-model procedure. This means that the 
first couple of blocks and the second couple of blocks are generally more similar than blocks 
from different couples. Analogous figures can be constructed for the other two policy 
domains. For lack of space, we illustrate the results for EU-integration only. 
 
  < Figures 6 about here > 
 
There are two possible types of conflict that shape the policy field of EU integration. The first 
type of conflict is a fundamental one and refers to the question of whether a nation should 
join or remain within the European Union. The second type of conflict deals with the way 
European integration should proceed. Here the debates center around a supranational vs. 
intergovernmental or a liberal versus social Europe. In Switzerland and the UK, the conflicts 
are of the fundamental type. Its relationship with the European and global context has 
become the key political cleavage in the non EU-member state Switzerland over the past 
decade (Kriesi et al. 2005). For the UK, the EU integration process is still a heavily disputed 
project as illustrated by the widespread rejection of and mobilization against the common 
currency, the Euro. The struggle might have been domesticated in the last years as Blair is 
said to have a more positive stance towards Europe than the former governments (Armstrong 
and Bulmer 2003: 389). By contrast, in the countries where cooperative structures prevail – 
Spain, France and the Netherlands (see Figure 4c) – the conflicting relations refer to the way 
how integration should proceed. Germany is a special case to which we come back in a 
moment. 
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The block models of the domestic power structures in Figure 6 reveal these conflict 
constellations. In those countries with fundamental conflicts (Switzerland and the UK) there 
is a pro-EU coalition – in Switzerland it is composed of the integration establishment and the 
pro-EU left, in the UK of the state actors and the Labor party2. The anti-EU coalition in 
Switzerland is dominated by the SVP, the “Schweizerische Volkspartei”, who is the single 
most powerful actor in the field of EU integration in Switzerland. In the UK, the opposition 
parties – internally divided – are the main sources of critique and also of opposition towards 
the integration process. Business interest associations emerge as a third important block in 
both countries. In Switzerland they serve as brokers despite being divided by major internal 
disagreements: they cooperate with the integration establishment, reject the pro EU-left 
(including the unions) and bargain with those not willing to join the EU at all. In the UK 
business interest associations (including the unions and the Confederation of British Industry) 
cooperate with the state actors and the Labor party, while having disagreements with all other 
blocks. In both countries, power is shared between the pro- and anti-EU coalitions. Block 
four in Switzerland and block two in the UK, which are composed of the major EU 
opponents, have as much power as the traditional integration establishment.  
Surprisingly, the interactions between German actors prove to be dominated by conflicts 
regarding the EU integration project (see Figure 4c), too. Germany is normally characterized 
by a strong elite consensus on the integration project in support of the development of a 
European Constitution. For the main part of the German elite, the EU is an extension of their 
national constitutional system that does not lead to fundamental problems of legitimacy 
(Jachtenfuchs 2002: 283). A more detailed analysis of the German conflict constellation 
reveals that 75 percent of all conflictual relations originate from four out of the sixteen 
interviewed actors, namely the “Euromärsche”3, the unions, both part of block two, and the 
conservative and liberal opposition parties, both part of block one. Critique thus originates 
primarily from the left movements and from the opposition parties.  
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In fact, with its conflict centered on left movements, Germany resembles Spain and France. 
In all three countries, there is domestic conflict about the form of EU integration, which lacks 
the fundamental character symbolized in the existence of pro- and anti-EU coalitions. As 
Figure 4c shows, the degree of this domestic conflict is higher in Germany, followed by 
Spain and by France4. The latter two have been rated as cooperative. The main conflict line 
regarding the process of EU integration in these three countries refers to the question of a 
liberal versus social Europe. In all three countries – as the block model reveals – the unions 
and left NGOs constitute the focal point of conflict. As the distribution of power reveals, the 
left challengers are powerful actors in Spain, whereas in France they lack any substantial 
influence. In Germany, block two is not powerful as a whole, but it includes one powerful 
actor: the German union federation (DGB). In all three countries, the integration 
establishment is able to concentrate power, whereas in the UK and Switzerland – the 
countries characterized by a fundamental conflict - it has to share it with the anti-EU 
coalition. In the Netherlands a cooperative climate dominates. In this case the dominant 
conflict line cannot, however, easily be deduced from the block model. 
 
Conclusion 
In the present paper we have developed a typology of power structures in policy subsystems 
that is based on two key dimensions: the distribution of power and the predominant type of 
interaction in the policy network. The question of what kind of actors hold power has been 
introduced as a subsidiary aspect qualifying the first dimension. Combining these two main 
dimensions allowed us to describe six types of power structures. We argued that these power 
structures depend on the macro-political context, i.e. the European, domestic and policy-
specific context into which the relevant actors are embedded. To test the impact of these 
determinants, we have conducted reputational and network analyses. They reveal that the 
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European context heavily influences the policy-specific power structure. In Switzerland, the 
only non-EU member we studied, power remains almost exclusively nationally focused, 
while the shift of decision-making competences to the European level influences the power 
structures and interactions in EU-member states. The shift of power to the EU level is most 
far-reaching in the case of constitutional issues of EU integration and smallest for 
immigration policy, with agriculture taking an intermediary position. Interestingly, the shift 
of power to the supranational level is much more substantial with respect to the key actors 
than with regard to the domain-specific elites as a whole. This result points to the 
development of what we could call an “asymmetrical multi-level governance structure” – 
asymmetrical in the sense that supranational actors, indeed, become the most important 
policy-specific actors; a situation that relativizes the idea of a presumably balanced power 
sharing between the levels.  
Our hypotheses regarding the influence of the domestic and policy-specific contexts on the 
power structures have only partially been confirmed. On the one hand, regarding the overall 
domestic context of formal concentration of power and informal cooperation, our 
expectations have generally held up, with only one major exception: British policy networks 
turned out to be quite fragmented, resembling more closely those expected for consensus than 
for majoritarian democracies. On the other hand, a closer look at the differences between 
policy domains – within and between countries – shows the limitations of general country 
characteristics for explaining variations in power structures: country-specific configurations 
vary considerably from one policy domain to the other. Similarly, the analysis also showed 
the limitations of policy characteristics as an explanatory factor: power configurations vary 
from one country to the other in the same policy subsystem. We conclude that we need to 
take into account the complex interactions of country- and policy-specific elements in order 
to explain power configurations in a country-specific policy network. This implies that future 
research should no longer aim at national-level generalizations about power configurations 
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and policy processes, but needs to understand the combined impact of the country- and 
policy-specific contexts. Scholars need to develop more detailed hypotheses about how issue-
specific contexts vary from one country to the other and how such variations influence power 
configurations.  
The empirical test of such hypotheses requires a broad comparative research design, which 
allows for systematic variations of the context conditions. Based on our experience, we are 
aware of the limits and the difficulties of such a design. Most importantly, our study only 
provides a cross-sectional snapshot of the structural preconditions of policy-making. Ideally, 
the perspective developed here should be applied to the longitudinal study of policy-
networks. In addition, our experience indicates that the implementation of such a design is 
very demanding and presupposes the coordinated effort of country-specific teams. In spite of 
our concerted effort, the quality of the data still varies from one policy subsystem to the 
other, which implies that some of the subsystem-specific differences might be due to 
different implementations of the common design. Moreover, the number of organizations 
interviewed per network should have been larger in order to guarantee a more comprehensive 
view of each network. Finally, the empirical classifications are based on some rough and 
ready decisions concerning cutting points. They should be taken with a grain of salt and, 
ideally, should serve as a guide to more in-depth analyses of the policy debates in the specific 
networks. These limits notwithstanding, we are convinced that the comparative approach 
adopted here holds out considerable promise for a more integrated analysis of the impact of 
country and issue-specific contexts on policy-making. We believe that it will be most useful 
for the systematic study of policy change when applied longitudinally and when 
complemented by an in-depth analysis of the policy debates in the specific networks. 
 24 
Notes 
 
1 We made use of UCINET 6 (Borgatti, S.P., Everett, M.G. and Freeman, L.C. 2002. Ucinet for Windows: 
Software for Social Network Analysis. Harvard: Analytic Technologies) for this analysis. 
2 Wallace (2000b:2) claims that the UK has turned from a „regime-taker“ to a „regime-maker“ in some areas in 
the field of EU integration under the Blair government. 
3 Euromärsche claims to have conflicts with all other 15 interviewed actors. This biases the results and leads to 
an overestimation regarding the degree of conflict in Germany.  
4 The lack of conflict in France regarding EU integration is a result of the fact that the actors who have taken up 
the debate on EU integration, namely the party actors, were not interviewed. France is one of those few 
countries where EU integration has substantially altered the party landscape. There are communist, socialist, 
conservative and right-wing extreme EU adversaries. Part of these (new) parties are founded as split-offs of the 
traditional parties. But even within the main parties in France EU integration is one of the strongly debated 
issues (Goulard 2002), that has polarised the nation and shadowed French EU politics (Ziebura 2003: 305). 
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Figure 1: Typology of power structures 
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Figure 2: Typology of country-specific political opportunity structures 
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Figure 3 
Europeanization of power distribution in the member countries, by issue: ratios of index 
values 
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Figure 4 
Typology of country-specific political opportunity structures: empirical test 
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Figure 5 
Ratios of conflict/cooperation and bargaining/cooperation relations by country and policy 
domain 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of block types: average power and composition (percentages)1) 
 
 Block type power state party ig ngo total N 
1 „State-block“  0.65 67.4 13.5 18.0 1.1 100.0 84 
2 „Party block“  0.34 20.3 55.4 17.6 6.8 100.0 74 
3 „Interest-group block“  0.35 14.1 11.8 42.4 27.0 100.0 81 
4 „SMO-block“  0.27 1.1 6.8 31.8 60.7 100.0 80 
All blocks 0.41 26.7 21.1 26.4 25.8 100.0 319 
 
1) averages taken across all issues and countries 
 
Figure 6 
EU-Integration 
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